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CASES NOTED
ANTENUPTIAL TORTS AFTER DIYORCE
Plaintiff was the mother of a minor child whose death was proxi-
mately caused by the negligence of the defendant. Thereafter, the plaintiff
and the defendant were married. Subsequent to their divorce, the plaintiff
brought an action against the defendant alleging negligence under the
Florida wrongful death statute.' The defendant moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's right of action was ex-
tinguished by the marriage. The District Court for the Northern District
of Florida held, motion granted: under Florida law, a former spouse can-
not be sued for an antenuptial tort, because the marriage relation ex-
tinguishes all rights of action between spouses and such rights of action
are not re-created or revived by divorce. Gaston v. Pittman, 285 F. Supp.
645 (N.D. Fla. 1968).
The common law has long recognized the immunity from suit be-
tween spouses, which is historically based on the unity doctrine.2 Ac-
ceptance of this long standing doctrine has eroded with time as it has
been applied to property 3 and contract4 rights, but the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions still hold that spouses may not sue each other
for personal torts.5 Many jurisdictions now emphasize other justifications
for this position, such as the public interest in the protection of family
1. FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1967).
2. This doctrine holds that during marriage the husband and wife are one person in
the eyes of the law, and that all personal legal rights and duties depend upon their unity.
Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 442 (Lewis's ed.). Put another way, "Under the common law the woman
and the man became one person upon marriage, and that person was the husband." Taylor v.
Dorsey, 155 Fla. 305, 313, 19 So.2d 876, 880 (1944). Since the husband and wife had a
singular legal identity and since a person could not sue himself, no cause of action could
arise in favor of one spouse against the other. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910) ;
Tresher v. McElroy, 90 Fla. 372, 106 So. 79 (1925); Wallach v. Wallach, 94 Ga. App. 576,
95 S.E.2d 750 (1956); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953) (rejecting the unity
doctrine) ; Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 214 N.W. 305 (1927). The effect of the
doctrine has been that "marriage acts as a perpetually operating discharge of all wrongs
between man and wife, committed by one upon the other." Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304,
307, 24 Am. R. 27, 29 (1877).
3. Based on the construction of the married women's' emancipation acts, a wife may
sue her husband where her separate property is involved. White v. White, 58 Mich. 546, 25
N.W. 490 (1885); Carney v. Gleissner, 62 Wis. 493, 22 N.W. 735 (1885).
4. Based on the construction of the married women's emancipation acts, a wife may sue
her husband where contract rights between them are involved. Mathewson v. Mathewson,
79 Conn. 23, 63 A. 285 (1906); Smith v. Hughes, 292 Ky. 723, 167 S.W.2d 847 (1943)
Trayer v. Setzer, 72 Neb. 845, 101 N.W. 989 (1904).
5. A well developed discussion of the majority position may be found in Smith v.
Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955). For a collection of cases see 41 Am. JuR. 2d
Husband and Wile § 522 (1968); 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 396 (1944); Annot., 43
A.L.R. 2d 632, 636-41 (1955).
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harmony,6 the dangers of fraudulent claims against insurance companies,7
the availability of appropriate alternative remedies,8 and the interest in
final settlement between parties in divorce proceedings.9
Attack upon this rule most often revolves around the construction of
the married women's emancipation acts of the several states."0 Most
states have strictly construed these statutes so as to deny a right of action
against a spouse," while the minority of states which allow interspousal
6. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774
(Fla. 1950); Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); Patenaude v.
Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935); Romero v. Romero, 58 N.M. 201, 269
P.2d 748 (1954); Tanno v. Eby, 78 Ohio App. 21, 68 N.E.2d 813 (1946); Smith v. Smith,
205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955). In a dramatic overstatement of the policy behind the rule
one court has stated:
[If suits between spouses were allowed] [t]he flames which [such] litigation would
kindle on the domestic hearth would consume in an instant the conjugal bond
and bring on a new era indeed-an era of universal discord, of unchastity, of
bastardy, of dissoluteness, of violence, cruelty and murders. But will the courts
expose this fundamental relation to the consequences of unbridled litigation? Never.
Smith v. Smith, 14 Pa. D. & C. 466, 468 (1930).
7. It is suggested that the potential gain by a defendant husband from a judgment for
his wife to be paid by an insurance company would offer an incentive for fraudulent claims
that would be difficult to disprove because of the intimate relationship between parties. See
Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955). But see Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d
480 (Ky. 1953) ; Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1939).
8. See Main v. Main, 46 Ill. App. 106 (1892); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. R.
27 (1877); Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); Austin v. Austin,
136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924).
9. See Main v. Main, 46 Ill. App. 106 (1892) ; Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. R.
27 (1877); Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935). One court has
held that there is a presumption that all claims between parties were settled in the divorce
proceeding. Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 476, 118 P. 629 (1911).
10. While the differences between these statutes are substantive in some cases, Florida's
statute may be considered typical. FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1967) provides:
Every married woman is hereby empowered to take charge of, and manage and
control her separate property, to contract and to be contracted with, to sue and be
sued, and to sell, convey, transfer, mortgage, use and pledge her property, real
and personal, and to make, execute and deliver instruments and documents of every
character, without restraint, without the joinder or consent of her husband,
in all respects as fully as if she were unmarried. Every married woman, without
the joinder or consent of her husband, shall have and may exercise all rights and
powers with respect to her separate property, income and earnings, and may enter
into, obligate herself to perform, and enforce contracts or undertakings to the same
extent and in like manner as if she were unmarried; provided, however, that no
deed, mortgage or other instrument conveying or encumbering real property owned
by a married woman shall be valid without the joinder of her husband; provided,
further, that any claim or judgment against any married woman shall not be a claim
or lien against such married woman's inchoate right of dower in her husband's
separate property.
Another line of attack has been based on constitutional rights to redress all legal wrongs.
Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1939). One United States District Court
has held that the Florida Constitution confers such a right on married women. Alexander v.
Alexander, 140 F. Supp. 925 (W.D.S.C. 1956). But this decision has been expressly rejected
by the Florida Supreme Court as an incorrect statement of Florida law. Bencomo v. Bencomo,
200 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1967).
11. The basis of these decisions is that the statutes did not abrogate the common law
rule of unity or its attendant immunity to create a new right of action in the wife that was
not recognized by the common law. Instead, the legislatures merely intended to free the wife
of the procedural barrier of joinder of the husband so that she could sue and be sued on her
own behalf as well as manage her own property. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611
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claims for torts have paved the way for this development by liberal con-
struction of the statutes. 2
Most courts have decided that the right of action for antenuptial
torts is extinguished upon the marriage of the parties, and thus allow no
suit during marriage for an antenuptial tort." The majority of jurisdic-
tions have likewise held that since no right of action arose for torts com-
mitted during marriage, 4 there is therefore no basis for suit after termi-
nation of the marriage because divorce cannot re-create that which never
existed.' 5
(1910); Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950) ; Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174
A.2d 339 (1961); Koenigs v. Travis, 246 Minn. 466, 75 N.W.2d 478 (1956) ; Scales v.
Scales, 168 Miss. 439, 151 So. 551 (1934) ; Romero v. Romero, 58 N.M. 201, 269 P.2d 748
(1954); Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S.W.2d 263 (1932); Furey v. Furey, 193
Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952) ; Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 476, 118 P. 629 (1911);
Staats v. Co-Operative Transit Co. 125 W. Va. 473, 24 S.E.2d 916 (1943). Some courts
have emphasized the anomaly which would be produced by giving the wife a right of
action. Since at common law neither spouse could sue the other, construction of the married
women's emancipation act to allow suit by the wife would confer no equal right in the
husband:
At common law there was no right of action either by husband or wife against
the other for a personal tort. There was absolute equality in that respect. Therefore
there was no occasion to emancipate the wife with reference to such torts, because
the husband was under the same sort of disability as the wife. [If the statute gave
the wife a right of action,] we would have the novel situation of the wife having
a cause of action against her husband for a personal tort, while the husband would
have no such right against his wife; for there is nothing either in our Constitution
or statutes which gives any such right to the husband. Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss.
61, 72, 100 So. 591, 592 (1924).
At least one state has statutorily forbidden suits between spouses during coverture. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1959).
12. These jurisdictions generally hold that the married women's emancipation acts or the
state constitutions have abrogated the unity doctrine. Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335,
140 So. 378 (1932) ; Katzenberg v. Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696 (1931) ; Rains
v. Rains 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935) ; Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914) ;
Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733
(1949); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 A. 657 (1915); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516,
105 S.E. 206 (1920); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932);
Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1939) ; Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45,
102 S.E. 787 (1920) ; Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Taylor v.
Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475
(1926). One statute expressly provides for interspousal suits during coverture. N.Y. GEN.
OBLIc. LAW § 3-313(2) (McKinney 1964).
13. Carmichael v. Carmichael, 53 Ga. App. 663, 187 S.E. 116 (1936); Hunter v.
Livingston, 125 Ind. App. 422, 123 N.E.2d 912 (1955) (sympathizing with the minority
position) ; Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961) ; Lubowitz v. Taines, 293
Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1936) ; Scales v. Scales, 168 Miss. 439, 151 So. 551 (1934);
Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935) ; Orr v. Orr, 36 N.J. 236, 176
A.2d 241 (1961) ; Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S.W.2d 263 (1932); Furey v. Furey,
193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952) ; Staats v. Co-operative Transit Co., 125 W. Va. 473,
24 S.E.2d 916 (1943); Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931) (applying
Illinois law). One state has held that antenuptial agreements providing for the survival of
antenuptial rights of action after marriage are void as a matter of public policy. Tanno v. Eby,
78 Ohio App. 21, 68 N.E.2d 813 (1946). The two Florida decisions on this point have used
the language that the right of action "abates" during marriage, instead of saying it is
extinguished by the marriage. Webster v. Snyder, 103 Fla. 1131, 1132, 138 So. 755 (1932);
Amendola v. Amendola, 121 So.2d 805, 806 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
14. See note 5 supra.
15. Bencomo v. Bencomo, 200 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1967); Wallach v. Wallach, 94 Ga. App.
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The combination of legal relations necessary to involve both of these
principles has heretofore arisen only once, in the case of Henneger v.
Lomas.' 6 There the court applied both principles which, when read
together, preclude liability for antenuptial torts between spouses after
divorce; stating:
For the reason that the marriage extinguished antenuptial rights
of action for tort or upon contract between husband and wife,
the wife could not, after divorce from her husband or his death,
maintain an action against him or his estate for any injury to
her person or character by him before their marriage .... 17
The instant case adopts the view taken in Henneger as a correct
statement of the law in Florida.'"
Observing that Florida had not previously decided the question pre-
sented,'" and that the Florida married women's emancipation act2" had
been interpreted so as not to give a wife a substantive right of action
against her husband,2' the court turned its attention to the unity doc-
trine.22 The court reasoned that any right of action possessed by the
plaintiff was merged with the rights of the defendant upon her marriage
to him, and that the effect of such a merger was to abate the right of
action against him.2" The court determined that since the right of action
was extinguished by the marriage, divorce could not re-create it, for
nothing remained of it which could be revived.24
576, 95 S.E.2d 750 (1956); Main v. Main, 46 Ill. App. 106 (1892); Abbott v. Abbott, 67
Me. 304, 24 Am. R. 27 (1877); Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898) ;
Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906); Smith v. Smith, 14 Pa. D. & C. 466
(1930); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 476, 118 P. 629 (1911); Phillips v. Barnet, 1
Q.B.D. 436 (1876).
16. 145 Ind. 287, 44 N.E. 462 (1896). Other cases have stated the same rule in dicta.
See, e.g., Spector v. Weisman, 40 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1930); Wallach v. Wallach, 94 Ga.
App. 576, 95 S.E.2d 750 (1956).
17. Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 291, 44 N.E. 462, 463 (1896).
18. Gaston v. Pittman, 285 F. Supp. 645, 646, 650 (N.D. Fla. 1968).
19. Id. at 646.
20. FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1967). See note 10 supra.
21. Gaston v. Pittman, 285 F. Supp. 645, 646 (N.D. Fla. 1968). Accord, Corren v.
Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
22. Gaston v. Pittman, 285 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. Fla. 1968). At this point the court
thoroughly discussed the common law roots of the unity doctrine. Id. at 647-48. Other Florida
cases on similar questions have based their holdings on the unity doctrine. See Bencomo
v. Bencomo, 200 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1967) ; Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1955) ; Corren
v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950) ; Taylor v. Dorsey, 155 Fla. 305, 19 So.2d 876 (1944) ;
Webster v. Snyder, 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932); Amendola v. Amendola, 121 So.2d
805 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
23. Gaston v. Pittman, 285 F. Supp. 645, 648 (N.D. Fla. 1968). Attention was directed
to the meaning of the word "abates." Id. at 648-49. Other jurisdictions had unanimously held
that marriage extinguishes all antenuptial rights of action, see note 13 supra, and the court
for present purposes held that the words "abate" and "extinguish" have the same meaning.
Gaston v. Pittman, 285 F. Supp. 645, 648-49 (N.D. Fla. 1968). The distinction would become
important in a case where the marriage was invalid. In such circumstances the word "abate"
would mean suspend, and the right of action would survive the invalid marriage. Id. at
649-50 (dictum).
24. Gaston v. Pittman, 285 F. Supp. 645, 649 (N.D. Fla. 1968).
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If the Gaston case is followed, the effect would be to increase the
commitment of the Florida courts to the fiction of the unity doctrine.2 5
The decision has foreclosed the opportunity to limit the unity doctrine by
using a different interpretation of the word "abate" than was used in
earlier cases. 26 The result is an extension of the doctrine to provide im-
munity where neither the cause of action nor the suit upon it arose during
marriage.
The total emancipation of women in the last century makes the
unity doctrine a hollow justification upon which to hang the cloak of
immunity. Other rationales 27 offered to grant immunity in suits during
coverture for antenuptial torts, or after divorce for torts committed
during coverture, have no application to suits for antenuptial torts after
divorce. The interest in the preservation of domestic harmony is vitiated
by divorce.2 1 Collusive fraudulent claims against insurance companies
are no greater danger between former spouses for premarital torts than
between strangers, because the incentive for fraud, which is the potential
gain by the defendant by a finding of liability,29 does not exist after
divorce. 0
25. It is fictitious to the extent that in all other respects FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1967)
makes a married woman a free individual with virtually the same rights toward others as an
unmarried woman. See Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1939).
26. Interpretation of the word "abate" to mean suspend during marriage would have
allowed recovery in the instant case without overruling the unity doctrine's application to
other circumstances. It would be consistent with this conclusion to continue to rule that:
(1) marital suits for premarital torts are not maintainable, for the right of action is suspended
during marriage; (2) marital suits for marital torts are not maintainable for the double
reason that no right of action arises for torts committed during marriage, and even if such
right did arise it would be suspended during the marriage; (3) post marital suits for marital
torts are not maintainable, for no right of action arises for torts committed during marriage.
27. It is interesting to note that the court justified its conclusion solely upon the unity
doctrine, while more recent Florida cases have given some attention to the public interest
in the preservation of domestic harmony. See Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950)
Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1955).
28. Critics have vehemently argued that the act giving rise to the cause of action upon
which relief is sought and the readiness to seek judicial relief show that even before divorce,
marital harmony and tranquility are already destroyed and cannot be preserved by immunity
from suit. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 645-47 (1956); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 883 (3d ed. 1964); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in
Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1052-53 (1930); Comment, 51 Nw. U.L. REv.
610, 613-14 (1956). While this criticism may be accurate in cases involving intentional torts,
acts creating liability for negligence and the readiness to press suit against an insurance
company need not destroy domestic harmony and tranquility. In Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore.
286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955) the court stated:
[Tlhe peace and domestic tranquility of the home is [not] ended every time that a
wife is shaken up by the inattentive conduct of her husband in operating the family
automobile, or vice versa. Nor can it be said that domestic felicity has been forever
lost if a husband slips on a carelessly oiled kitchen floor. Id. at 307, 287 P.2d at 581.
29. See Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955).
30. Even if this were not the case, a similar risk of fraud exists in suits between friends
and persons enjoying guest status; see Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660
(1939), and no authority suggests that such suits should be barred. Where divorce has not
destroyed the incentive for fraud, faith in judicial competence has overcome the fear of fraud.
Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953).
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Justification for immunity in this case is likewise not found in the
assertion that other remedies are available to the injured spouse. Some
courts have suggested that divorce or criminal sanctions brought against
the defendant are sufficient." Aside from the limited application of these
remedies,32 they are in all cases inadequate because they do not com-
pensate the plaintiff for his injuries. 3
Finally, post divorce suits for personal torts have been barred based
upon the admonition that divorce should not open the door to litigation and
should act as a final settlement of tort claims between parties.34 Where
the right of action arose before marriage, the marriage was an obstacle
to its enforcement; removal of the obstacle by divorce should no more
affect the right of action for a tort than it would affect a similar right of
action for property or in contract.
As the result of the instant case, a strongly criticised legal anomaly
has been extended to circumstances which by their unique character
defy all rational justifications which can be offered for similar situa-
tions. 5 It appears, however, that if the slightest deviation from the
blanket immunity of the common law is to be made, the cry for help
must first be heeded by the legislature. 6 From all indications, the courts
are either unwilling or unable to abolish a rule of law which has been
obsolete for more than half a century.
PHIIrP GERSON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
THE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE
At the voir dire examination in the petitioner's trial for murder in
a state court of Illinois, the prosecution successfully challenged for cause
forty-seven of the ninety-six prospective jurors under the authority of
the following statute:
In trials for murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any
juror who shall, on being examined, state that he has conscien-
tious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed
to the same.'
31. See note 8 supra.
32. These remedies would not even apply to the instant case, for the parties are already
divorced and no criminal action could be brought against the defendant for ordinary
negligence.
33. See Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1939).
34. See note 9 supra.
35. See note 28 supra.
36. Judicial restraint seems to be the watchword for leaving changes of such magnitude
to the legislature. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Corren v. Corren,
47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
1. Il. Rev. Stat., chs. 38, 743 (1959).
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